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Abstract
Collectively blaming groups for the actions of individuals can license vicarious retribution. Acts of terrorism
by Muslim extremists against innocents, and the spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes against innocent Muslims
that follow, suggest that reciprocal bouts of collective blame can spark cycles of violence. How can this cycle
be short-circuited? After establishing a link between collective blame of Muslims and anti-Muslim attitudes
and behavior, we used an “interventions tournament” to identify a successful intervention (among many that
failed). The “winning” intervention reduced collective blame of Muslims by highlighting hypocrisy in the ways
individuals collectively blame Muslims—but not other groups (White Americans, Christians)—for
individual group members’ actions. After replicating the effect in an independent sample, we demonstrate that
a novel interactive activity that isolates the psychological mechanism amplifies the effectiveness of the
collective blame hypocrisy intervention and results in downstream reductions in anti-Muslim attitudes and
anti-Muslim behavior.
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Article
. . . until [Muslims] recognize and destroy their growing jihadist 
cancer they must be held responsible.
—Tweet from Rupert Murdoch, Chairman of Fox News, January 
9, 2015
On April 15, 2013, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev deto-
nated two bombs at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. 
The Tsarnaev brothers cited the treatment of Muslims by the 
U.S. military overseas as motivation for the attacks (Wilson, 
Miller, & Horwitz, 2013). However, all the three people who 
were killed and over 200 injured from the blast were American 
civilians not directly involved in U.S. military interventions 
overseas. Since the Boston Marathon bombings, a handful of 
other attacks by Muslims on Americans have been launched, 
also targeting civilians. On the other side, each terror attack 
committed by Muslims has been followed by rhetoric (like the 
tweet above) explicitly blaming all Muslims for any attack, 
and a multifold increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes commit-
ted by non-Muslim Americans against Muslim Americans 
(Ingraham, 2015). The pattern of attack and reprisal against 
innocents from each group reveals a particular psychological 
calculus of intergroup conflict: People have a tendency to hold 
groups collectively responsible for the actions of individual 
group members, which justifies “vicarious retribution” against 
any group member to exact revenge (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, 
Denson, & Schmader, 2006).
Previous research has demonstrated the relevance of col-
lective blame in organizational settings, showing that compa-
nies, schools, and even loosely affiliated groups of people are 
held responsible for the harmful actions of individual group 
members (Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000; Manchi 
Chao, Zhang, & Chiu, 2008; Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 
1999; Singh et al., 2012; Zemba, Young, & Morris, 2006). 
Much of this research has focused on identifying differences 
in the tendency to engage in collective blame in Eastern ver-
sus Western cultures (e.g., Chiu et al., 2000; Manchi Chao 
et al., 2008), on discerning the psychological precursors of 
collective blame, including perceived outgroup homogeneity 
and entitativity (e.g., Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, & 
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Ames, 2006; Lickel et al., 2006), and on examining the con-
sequences of collective blame—namely, exacting revenge on 
people from an offending group who were uninvolved of the 
offense (i.e., “vicarious retribution”; Lickel et al., 2006; 
Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, & Miller, 2008). However, this 
previous work has given less consideration to collective 
blame in intergroup contexts, despite its clear potential to 
contribute importantly to intergroup hostility.
In a first study, we sought to examine the proclivity for 
and correlates of collective blame within the realm of inter-
group relations. Specifically, we assessed the degree to 
which individuals collectively blamed Muslims for acts of 
mass violence committed by small groups of Muslims and 
tested the extent to which variability in collective blame pre-
dicted anti-Muslim attitudes and beliefs (prejudice and dehu-
manization), support for antagonistic policies toward 
Muslims, and hostile behavior toward Muslims. Having 
identified the importance of collective blame, in the remain-
ing studies we focused our efforts on understanding how it 
might be reduced. Our initial approach was to gather a range 
of potential intervention strategies and test them against each 
other in an “intervention tournament.”
Intervention Tournament
Consistent with the tenets of “action research” (Lewin, 
1946), we sought to determine not only “what works” to 
reduce collective blame of Muslims, but also “what works 
best.” We therefore focused our efforts not on a single inter-
vention, but instead evaluated the efficacy of a number of 
interventions simultaneously in an “intervention tourna-
ment” (for similar approaches, see J-PAL Policy Bulletin, 
2012; Lai et al., 2014; Lai et al., 2016). The interventions in 
the current study were videos created by nonscientists that 
tapped into at least one identifiable psychological process. 
Each of the videos was chosen because it spanned different 
styles of delivery (didactic, narrative, satire) and had, in our 
estimation, theoretically distinct psychological content. This 
allowed us to map specific psychological theories onto each 
of the videos (albeit more tightly in some cases than others). 
We hypothesized that each of the videos could reduce collec-
tive blame, either directly or indirectly, and reasoned that 
once we had identified a successful intervention (or set of 
interventions), we could then more deliberately explore the 
mechanism underlying it (or them).
Overview of Research
In Study 1, we sought to establish the importance of collec-
tive blame to an important contemporary intergroup conflict 
by showing that the degree to which Americans collectively 
blame Muslims for acts of terrorism is associated with anti-
Muslim attitudes, policy support, and behavior.
In Study 2a and Supplemental Study 1, we examined the 
efficacy of interventions aimed at reducing anti-Muslim 
attitudes and behaviors. In a “forecasting tournament” 
(Supplemental Study 1), we had one group of participants 
predict the effect of each intervention on collective blame. In 
an “intervention tournament” (Study 2a), we used a second 
group of participants to determine the actual effect of each 
video on collective blame (then compared the actual effects 
with the forecasted effects, in supplemental analyses). After 
identifying a “winning” approach in the intervention tourna-
ment, we replicated the effects in an independent sample 
(Study 2b).
Because we had less control over the specific content of 
the intervention videos, we could only speculate about the 
processes by which any given video may have been effec-
tive. One of the videos that emerged as most effective in the 
intervention tournament highlighted, among other things, the 
hypocrisy in collectively blaming Muslims but not other 
groups (e.g., Christians) for the actions of a few group mem-
bers. This approach resembles the classic cognitive disso-
nance hypocrisy paradigm (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991), 
in which hypocrisy is induced by the combination of two 
factors: (a) Having individuals advocate for a position, and 
then (b) making them aware of failure to act in accord with 
that position. One way to resolve the resulting cognitive dis-
sonance (Festinger, 1962) is to change one’s behavior to act 
in accord with the advocated position. We theorized that the 
video in the intervention tournament worked because high-
lighting hypocrisy in collective blame induced dissonance, 
which could be resolved by reducing collective blame of 
Muslims. To verify this, we developed in Studies 3a and 3b a 
novel interactive activity that was specifically designed to 
target the proposed psychological mechanism through a 
Socratic exercise. We tested the effectiveness of this activity 
relative to two other theoretically distinct and intuitively 
promising activities (Study 3a) and replicated the effects of 
the activity in a second study (Study 3b).
Thus, this research took a full-cycle approach by (a) iden-
tifying collective blame as an important psychological pro-
cess associated with anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior 
using correlational data, (b) seeking a successful intervention 
to causally mitigate collective blame, and then (c) testing the 
mechanism for the successful intervention by developing a 
new targeted intervention focused on the proposed key 
“ingredient.”
Study 1
In Study 1, we sought to determine the prevalence and cor-
relates of collective blame in an intergroup context by exam-
ining non-Muslim Americans’ collective blame of Muslims 
for terror attacks. In a cross-sectional study, non-Muslim 
American participants reported how much they blamed 
Muslims for the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 
that killed 130 people and injured hundreds more. We then 
examined the association between collective blame and hos-
tile attitudes, beliefs, and behavior toward Muslims.
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We reasoned that holding all Muslims responsible for a 
terror attack would be associated with endorsement of anti-
Muslim attitudes and beliefs. We focused on anti-Muslim 
prejudice and blatant dehumanization of Muslims. We also 
reasoned that collective blame of Muslims would be associ-
ated with more downstream support for anti-Muslim policies 
and anti-Muslim behavior (e.g., willingness to sign anti-
Muslim petitions).
Method
For this study and all following studies, we determined our 
sample size a priori, did not exclude any data from analyses, 
and included in our analyses all manipulations and measures, 
except where explicitly specified.
Participants. For this correlational study with a range of vari-
ables, we aimed to collect a relatively large sample of 200 par-
ticipants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Of the 200 
non-Muslim Americans who completed the survey, seven 
failed an attention check question embedded in the survey, 
leaving 193 participants (104 female, M
age
 = 35.69, SD = 
11.38). The final sample was 49.7% Christian, 2.6% Jewish, 
2.1% Buddhist, 0.5% Hindu, 33.2% atheist/agnostic, and 3.6% 
“Other,” with 8.3% of participants providing no response. Eth-
nically, the sample was 80.3% White, 6.2% Asian, 4.7% His-
panic, 6.7% Black, 0.5% Native American, and 1.6% “Other.”
Procedure and stimuli. Participants completed a survey that 
assessed the key measure of collective blame, measures of 
anti-Muslim attitudes and beliefs (i.e., blatant dehumaniza-
tion and prejudice), support for anti-Muslim policies, and 
two anti-Muslim behavioral measures.
Collective Blame was assessed by presenting participants 
with a brief description of the Paris terror attacks (“In 
November 2015, terror attacks in Paris killed 130 people and 
wounded hundreds. How responsible do you think Muslims 
are for the attacks in Paris?”) and then having them report 
how responsible they felt “Muslims in general” and “French 
Muslims” were for the attacks using unmarked sliders 
anchored at 0 (not at all) and 100 (very much). Note that this 
study occurred in the weeks after the attacks, when media 
coverage of them was ubiquitous.
Blatant Dehumanization was assessed by asking partici-
pants how well a series of eight dehumanizing traits/trait 
pairs (e.g., “savage,” “unsophisticated,” “barbaric, cold-
hearted”; Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, 
& Cotterill, 2015) applied to Muslims (α = .95).
Prejudice was assessed by standardizing and combining 
responses to two different prejudice measures: feeling ther-
mometers (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993) and a multi-
item measure of Islamoprejudice (Imhoff & Recker, 2012). 
With the feeling thermometers, participants reported their 
affective prejudice toward a range of groups—including 
Americans and Muslims—on unmarked sliders anchored at 
0 (very cold/unfavorable) and 100 (very warm/favorable). 
We took as our measure of anti-Muslim prejudice the differ-
ence in response to Americans versus Muslims. 
Islamoprejudice was assessed using a 15-item scale devel-
oped by Imhoff and Recker (2012). The 15-item scale 
includes nine items (e.g., “Islam is an archaic religion, 
unable to adjust to the present”) that reflect Islamoprejudice 
and have previously been associated with anti-Muslim 
intentions. These are differentiated from six further items 
intended to reflect a secular critique of Islam that have been 
shown to be unassociated with anti-Muslim intentions 
(Imhoff & Recker, 2012) and which we therefore excluded 
from analyses. Responses were made on unmarked sliders 
anchored at 0 (completely disagree) and 100 (completely 
agree). A factor analysis revealed that one of the 
Islamoprejudice items loaded more strongly with the Secular 
Concern items; we therefore created an Islamoprejudice 
scale with the remaining eight items (α = .83). To create a 
single measure of prejudice, feeling thermometer and 
Islamoprejudice were each z scored and then combined (r = 
.66, p < .001).
Anti-Muslim Policy Support was assessed by asking par-
ticipants to indicate their support for nine policies targeting 
Muslims taken from Kteily and Bruneau (2017); sample 
items included “We should ban the wearing of the Islamic 
veil” and “We should ban the opening of any new Mosques in 
this country.” Responses were made on 7-point Likert-type 
scales anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly 
agree). Several of the policies were adapted directly from 
campaign statements of (then Presidential candidate) Donald 
Trump (α = .95).
Punitive Counterterrorism (behavior) was assessed 
using a measure adapted from Kteily et al. (2015) in which 
participants were asked to allocate funds in any proportion 
to two antiterrorism programs: “Build libraries and schools 
in Muslim-majority communities throughout the United 
States” (i.e., “preventative counter-terrorism”) and 
“Increase surveillance and policing capabilities in Muslim-
majority communities throughout the United States” (i.e., 
“punitive counter-terrorism”). We took the proportion of 
funds distributed to punitive counterterrorism as the 
 outcome measure.
Signing Anti-Muslim Petitions (behavior) was assessed 
by giving participants the opportunity to sign six petitions 
urging congressional members to implement anti-Muslim 
policies (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017; Kteily et al., 2015). Three 
of the petitions focused on Muslim refugees (sample item: 
“Urge congressional members to deny entry to any Muslim 
refugees who seek to come to the United States”); the other 
three petitions were associated with Muslims more generally 
(sample item: “Urge congressional members to introduce 
surveillance programs targeting Mosques in the United 
States”). Responses were coded as +1 for signatures in sup-
port of anti-Muslim petitions, –1 for signatures to the coun-
terpetitions, and 0 for no signature (α = .93).
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Results
The primary goals of Study 1 were to examine the degree to 
which Muslims are held collectively responsible for an indi-
vidual terror attack, and the correlates of collective blame. 
The mean response on the 100-point scale was 35.65 (SD = 
34.84) for the terror attacks in Paris in 2015. Confirming our 
predictions, we found that the tendency to hold Muslims 
collectively responsible was significantly correlated with 
each of the other measures (Table 1). Thus, those who col-
lectively blamed Muslims were also more likely to feel prej-
udiced against Muslims, dehumanize them, support 
anti-Muslim policies, donate to surveillance over education 
in Muslim communities to prevent terrorism, and sign peti-
tions targeting Muslims. We observed a similar pattern of 
results when we examined participants’ tendency to collec-
tively blame French Muslims (rather than “Muslims in 
general”).
Study 2a
Study 1 confirmed that the degree to which Americans col-
lectively blame Muslims for acts of terrorism is associated 
with anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior. This study thus 
verifies that collective blame is relevant in the intergroup 
domain and holds the potential to importantly influence 
downstream policy attitudes and behavior. In Study 2a, we 
shifted our attention to determining how collective blame 
can be reduced by determining the efficacy of eight different 
video interventions.
We conducted two separate studies using the videos. In 
the main experiment (Study 2a), participants reported col-
lective blame, other anti-Muslim attitudes (blatant dehu-
manization, prejudice, Islamoprejudice), and outcomes 
associated with vicarious retribution as part of an “inter-
vention tournament.” As a secondary aim, we had a sepa-
rate sample of participants (Supplementary Study 1) report 
their lay predictions of each video’s effectiveness using a 
“forecasting tournament,” in which participants predicted 
how much other non-Muslim Americans would collectively 
blame Muslims for individual acts of terrorism after watch-
ing each video.
The forecasting tournament was included to control for 
potential experimenter bias (i.e., consciously or uncon-
sciously pitting a “favored” video against a set of weak, low-
quality, or inferior alternatives) but mostly to extend insights 
about individuals’ (lack of) ability to forecast the success of 
interventions (e.g., Cialdini, 2003; Noar, 2006) to the realm 
of intergroup relations. It is possible that the prevalence of 
intergroup hostility provides individuals with good lay intu-
itions about its underlying causes (and how to reduce hostil-
ity). However, it is also possible that individuals are poor at 
identifying effective approaches for improving intergroup 
relations because these interventions may be operating in 
ways that are not easily accessible to lay perceivers (e.g., 
through unconscious processes). Addressing this question is 
theoretically important because it extends the generalizabil-
ity of prior demonstrations of poor forecasting to intergroup 
processes, and practically important because finding that 
individuals are poor judges of what works when it comes to 
reducing hostility would have major implications for non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and others who develop 
interventions based on intuition or focus groups, but do not 
test for their effects.
For the tournaments, we chose eight 2- to 4-min videos 
that included psychological elements that could directly or 
indirectly reduce collective blame. In one video (Video 1), a 
Muslim woman revealed the hypocrisy of blaming Muslims 
as a group for Muslim extremists, but not blaming Christians 
as a group for Christian extremists. This approach is loosely 
aligned with a hypocrisy paradigm that has been successfully 
employed to generate cognitive dissonance and induce proso-
cial behaviors (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, & Miller, 
1992; Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone & Fernandez, 2008). We 
therefore thought it plausible that the induction or revelation 
of the hypocrisy of collectively blaming some groups but not 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Variable Intercorrelations in Study 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Collective blame —  
2. Blatant dehumanization .71*** —  
3. Prejudice .73** .78*** —  
4. Punitive counterterror .72*** .72*** .84*** —  
5. Anti-Muslim policies .68*** .63*** .81*** .85*** —  
6. Anti-Muslim petitions .56*** .54*** .60*** .68*** .58*** —
M 35.65a 3.66b 0.00c 38.12a 2.86b −0.08d
SD 34.84 1.52 1.00 37.63 1.77 0.53
aScale: 0 to 100.
bScale: 1 to 7.
cScale: z score.
dScale: –1, 0, +1.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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others could reduce collective blame of Muslims. Five videos 
(Videos 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6) targeted collective blame indirectly 
by challenging the homogeneity and/or entitativity of 
Muslims. As group homogeneity and entitativity serve as 
direct precursors to collective blame (Denson et al., 2006; 
Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003), reducing these percep-
tions could plausibly erode collective blame. Video 2 chal-
lenged the perception of Muslim homogeneity by presenting 
the diversity of the Muslim experience as part of an engaging 
TED Talk, and Videos 1, 5, and 6 challenged Muslim homo-
geneity by providing counterstereotypical exemplars, such as 
an assertive (vs. submissive) Muslim woman (Videos 1 and 
6), or a soft-spoken Muslim cleric talking about his love for, 
and deference to, his wife (Video 5). Another video chal-
lenged perceived homogeneity of Muslims directly with 
didactic arguments during a confrontational television news 
interview (Video 3).
Many of the videos also included elements that we 
hypothesized would reduce anti-Muslim attitudes in general, 
but which could also affect collective blame specifically. For 
example, three of the videos (Videos 1, 5, and 6) gave par-
ticipants the opportunity to hear directly from Muslims about 
their own experiences, allowing perspective-taking, which 
has been shown in many studies to improve intergroup atti-
tudes and foster prosocial behavior (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012; 
Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). As the perspectives often 
illustrated nuanced views and challenged stereotypes, the 
shared perspectives could also reduce collective blame indi-
rectly by reducing perceived homogeneity.
Another video (Video 7) provided normative examples of 
Americans espousing and engaging in pro-Muslim behav-
iors: A White mother helping her child donate to a vandal-
ized mosque, and an interview with a man who attended a 
2nd amendment rally across the street from a mosque wear-
ing a “Fuck Islam” T-shirt who spoke of the transformation 
he experienced after accepting an invitation from the imam 
of the mosque to observe a service. Social proof has been 
shown previously to strongly influence behavior (McDonald 
& Crandall, 2015), and we thought it plausible that seeing 
others engage in pro-Muslim behaviors might influence par-
ticipants’ views of Muslims. The videos could specifically 
reduce collective blame through social proof—showing peo-
ple who do not hold Muslims collectively responsible (even 
if they once did).
Two videos (Videos 4 and 6) challenged common beliefs 
about Muslims (that they hate America/Americans, and that 
Muslim immigrants would strain the economy) by citing 
data countering these views. Notably, in providing data 
from Pew surveys showing that people in the Muslim world 
generally respect and appreciate America/Americans, 
Video 6 challenged negative meta-perceptions—a  technique 
that has been shown to reduce reciprocal hostility (Kteily, 
Hodson, & Bruneau, 2016). Finally, six videos (Videos 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, and 8) challenged the stereotype that Islam is a 
uniquely violent religion. For example, in Video 8, a 
documentarian read to people on the street passages from 
the “Quran” that condone violence, only to reveal that it 
was actually an Old Testament wrapped in a Quran book 
cover. Challenging the view that Muslim religious teach-
ings are uniquely violent may indirectly reduce the percep-
tion that Muslims are intrinsically supportive of violence, 
which could reduce the tendency to blame all Muslims for 
the violent actions of individual group members.
It is worth noting that the psychological mechanisms 
listed above are speculative—reflecting what we theorized 
were the main psychological “ingredients” of each video—
and not necessarily exhaustive. Moreover, individual videos 
sometimes included elements potentially operating via mul-
tiple psychological mechanisms, and the style of a given 
video or its protagonist could enhance or detract from the 
efficacy of any given intervention. Therefore, we suggest 
that this type of intervention tournament should not be used 
as evidence against the utility of any particular theoretical 
approach to reduce collective blame. Rather, we viewed this 
method as a first step to identify promising approaches, rul-
ing in a subset of potentially relevant psychological factors 
that could then be subjected to further analysis and targeted 
verification. We take this approach here.
We randomly assigned non-Muslim American partici-
pants to view one of the intervention videos, an “empty” con-
trol condition (in which participants saw no-video), or a 
“negative control” condition. For the “negative control,” par-
ticipants watched a video in which a Muslim woman pro-
vided “criticism from within,” suggesting that Islam is 
inherently violent, and that there is a clash between Muslim 
cultures and the West. We hypothesized that this video would 
increase collective blame of Muslims and hostility toward 
them, by framing them as an inherently violent group dedi-
cated to aggressing against Western targets. Notably, evi-
dence showing that decreasing collective blame improves 
attitudes toward Muslims or evidence showing that increas-
ing collective blame worsens attitudes would support our 
theoretical suggestion that collective blame can cause anti-
Muslim sentiments (although the former would, of course, 
be more useful for the practical purpose of promoting inter-
group harmony). We also note that the arguments presented 
in the “negative control” are conceptually similar to many 
arguments presented on mainstream U.S. media in the after-
math of violent attacks by Muslims in the United States, 
making the inclusion of the “negative” control video both a 
theoretically informative and practically relevant point of 
comparison against which to assess the interventions. For 
links to each video and a summary of the information they 
contain, see Table 2.
Participants
We performed a power analysis using G*Power 3.1, and found 
that obtaining a small effect size (d = .30), with an alpha of .05 
and power of .95 would require at least 135 participants per 
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condition. To allow for the loss of data from people who failed 
an embedded attention check, we recruited 180 participants 
for each of the 10 conditions in the study. Thirty-five partici-
pants failed the check question, leaving 1,765 participants in 
the final analyses (49.8% female, M
age
 = 34.75, SD = 11.3). 
The final sample was 46.2% Christian, 1.7% Jewish, 1.7% 
Buddhist, 0.7% Hindu, 43.8% atheist/agnostic, and 5.8% 
“Other.” Ethnically, the sample was 77.8% White, 6.0% Asian, 
5.8% Hispanic, 7.0% Black, 0.6% Native American, 0.2% 
Arab, 2.1% biracial, and 0.5% “Other.”1
Procedure and Stimuli
Participants were randomly assigned to view one of the eight 
videos, the negative control video, or the no-video control 
condition. After viewing one of the videos (or not, in the no-
video control condition), participants completed a survey, 
which included the key measure of collective blame, two mea-
sures assessing attitudes and beliefs about Muslims (dehuman-
ization, prejudice) and two outcome measures (anti-Muslim 
policy support and support for punitive counterterrorism).
Table 2. Summaries and Potential Psychological Mechanisms for the Videos Used for the Intervention Tournament (Study 2a) and 
Forecasting Tournament (Supplemental Study 1).
Link and summary of condition video Potential psychological mechanisms Length
Negative Control: Muslims Responsible
https://player.vimeo.com/video/159133535
Interview with a Syrian-born woman who attacks Islam and Muslims as backward, 
primitive, violent, and at odds with Western civilization.
[Increased] homogeneity; 
stereotyping
3:12
Video 1: Collective Blame Hypocrisy
https://player.vimeo.com/video/158199836
Al Jazeera interview with Linda Sarsour, a Muslim American woman who discusses 
the tendency to blame all Muslims for terror attacks, but not blame Christians 
for extremism by individual Christians.
Cognitive dissonance; perspective-
taking; counterstereotyping; 
decrease homogeneity
2:07
Video 2: Homogeneity 1
https://player.vimeo.com/video/159133534
TED talk by a Muslim American man describing (and showing) his photo-
journalistic journey through diverse Muslim communities around the world.
Decrease homogeneity; decrease 
entitativity; counterstereotyping
4:24
Video 3: Homogeneity 2
https://player.vimeo.com/video/158199837
CNN interview with Reza Aslan, a Muslim American scholar who challenges the 
view (expressed by the hosts) that policies in one Muslim-majority country 
should characterize “Muslims” or “Islam.”
Decrease homogeneity; decrease 
entitativity; counterstereotyping; 
cognitive dissonance
4:04
Video 4: Counterstereotyping 1
https://player.vimeo.com/video/159133531
A segment from the satirical news program, The Daily Show, in which host John 
Oliver calls out media bias in their negative coverage of Muslims and Muslim 
violence.
Counterstereotyping; humanization; 
collective guilt
3:52
Video 5: Counterstereotyping 2
https://player.vimeo.com/video/158199845
A short video that witnesses an Egyptian imam and his wife describing their loving 
and respectful relationship to a small group of Muslims.
Counterstereotyping; decrease 
homogeneity; decrease 
entitativity; perspective-taking
2:41
Video 6: Challenge Meta-Perceptions
https://player.vimeo.com/video/159133532
MSNBC interview with Dalia Mogahed, a Muslim American researcher who 
presents data from Pew surveys illustrating that Muslims view Americans and 
America favorably.
Improve meta-perceptions; 
perspective-taking; decrease 
homogeneity; decrease entitativity
3:35
Video 7: Normative Prosocial
https://player.vimeo.com/video/160259623
Two news clips: A White conservative who describes his change of heart after 
visiting a mosque he was protesting across from; a White boy and his mother 
interviewed after donating money to a vandalized mosque.
Social proof (prosocial norms) 3:23
Video 8: Counterstereotyping 3
https://player.vimeo.com/video/159133527
“Gotcha” interviews where people respond to “Quran” passages that are 
primitive and intolerant by modern social norms, and then revealing that the 
passages were actually from a Bible in a Quran book cover.
Counterstereotyping; cognitive 
dissonance
3:16
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Collective Blame was assessed as in Study 1, but with 
respect to the Brussels Airport terror attack, which had occurred 
weeks prior to the study (“How responsible do you think 
Muslims in general are for the attacks at the Brussels Airport?”).
Dehumanization was assessed using the Ascent 
Dehumanization scale (Kteily et al., 2015), which presents 
participants with the popular “Ascent of Man” diagram and 
asks them to determine where target groups fall on the scale, 
from the quadrupedal early human ancestor (0) to fully 
“evolved” modern human (100). We took as our measure of 
dehumanization the difference in reported “evolvedness” 
between Americans and Muslims.
Prejudice was assessed as in Study 1, by standardizing 
and averaging the Islamoprejudice composite (α = .89) and 
feeling thermometer ratings; r = .74, p < .001. Anti-Muslim 
Policy Support (α = .92) and Punitive Counterterrorism were 
also assessed as in Study 1.2
Results
Interventions tournament. For descriptive statistics and vari-
able intercorrelations for the control condition, see Table S1. 
Mean results for each condition, ANOVAs, and t tests are 
presented in Table 3.
In the intervention tournament, participants were 
assigned to view one of the videos (or not, in the no-video 
control condition) and were then asked to report their collec-
tive blame of Muslims. We found a significant effect of con-
dition on collective blame, F(9, 1719) = 4.72, p < .001, η2 = 
.024. We then conducted a series of planned t tests to exam-
ine the differences in collective blame between those in the 
control condition and those who watched each of the videos. 
Only Video 1 (“Collective Blame Hypocrisy”) significantly 
reduced collective blame (M = 20.66, SD = 28.53) relative 
to the no-video control condition, t(343) = 2.69, p = .008, d 
= .29. Collective blame was also significantly lower for 
those in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy condition versus 
those in four of the remaining seven intervention conditions 
(ts > 2.1, ps < .04). Mean collective blame scores were mar-
ginally lower among participants who viewed Videos 6 
(“Challenge Meta-Perceptions”) and 7 (“Normative 
Prosocial”) relative to those in the no-video control condi-
tion (ts > 1.8, ps < .075).
On the contrary, participants who viewed the negative 
control video (“Muslims Responsible”) reported signifi-
cantly higher collective blame (M = 40.08, SD = 35.75) ver-
sus those in the no-video control condition, M = 29.78, SD = 
34.18; t(349) = 2.76, p = .006, d = .30, and versus those in 
Table 3. Study 2a: Means (SD) and ANOVAs for Each Measure.
Condition Collective blame
Blatant 
dehumanization Prejudice
Punitive 
counterterrorism
Anti-Muslim  
policies
Scale 0-100 100-+100 z score 0-100 1-7
Muslims responsible
(N = 177)
40.08a
(35.75)
15.48a
(27.12)
.378a
(1.08)
65.15
(37.34)
3.13
(1.78)
No-video control
(N = 174)
29.78
(34.18)
8.56
(25.18)
.068
(1.06)
67.14
(34.69)
2.95
(1.66)
Collective blame Hypocrisy
(N = 176)
20.66a
(28.53)
5.90
(21.96)
−.136b
(0.91)
69.63
(33.56)
2.71
(1.61)
Homogeneity 1
(N = 178)
30.87
(33.27)
5.26
(18.57)
−.053
(0.88)
65.82
(36.53)
2.90
(1.72)
Homogeneity 2
(N = 171)
27.99
(32.46)
5.29
(22.59)
−.062
(0.93)
68.40
(34.42)
2.87
(1.63)
Counterstereotyping 1
(N = 177)
27.97
(33.29)
6.85
(20.15)
−.022
(1.00)
68.89
(36.76)
2.81
(1.65)
Counterstereotyping 2
(N = 179)
30.46
(34.77)
8.84
(25.54)
.081
(1.04)
66.17
(36.31)
2.94
(1.74)
Challenge meta-
perceptions
(N = 175)
23.40b
(31.07)
9.31
(21.52)
−.086
(1.06)
69.59
(35.61)
2.85
(1.74)
Normative prosocial
(N = 175)
23.12b
(31.18)
5.85
(21.55)
−.112
(1.01)
68.27
(35.29)
2.80
(1.68)
Counterstereotyping 3
(N = 181)
29.63
(33.48)
8.96
(22.96)
−.069
(0.93)
65.30
(36.25)
2.97
(1.66)
ANOVA
F(9, 1764)
4.72***
η2 = .024
3.19**
η2 = .016
4.13**
η2 = .021
.42 .83
a(and bold) Means that are significantly different from no-video controls (p < .05).
bMeans that are marginally different from no-video controls (p < .10).
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each of the other intervention conditions (ts > 2.4, ps < .02). 
See Table 3 for means responses to all measures across con-
dition and Figure S1 for a graphical depiction of mean col-
lective blame ratings across all videos.
We also examined mean responses to the two negative atti-
tudes and beliefs (blatant dehumanization, prejudice), and the 
two outcome measures (support for punitive counterterror-
ism, support for anti-Muslim policies). There was a main 
effect of condition for the attitudes and beliefs, blatant dehu-
manization: F(9, 1757) = 3.19, p = .001, η2 = .016; prejudice: 
F(9, 1763) = 4.13, p < .001, η2 = .021, but not for the outcome 
measures (Fs < 1). We conducted planned t tests on each of 
dehumanization and prejudice to see which intervention(s) 
drove the effect.
Those in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy condition (Video 
1) reported marginally lower levels of prejudice (M = –.136, 
SD = 0.91) than no-video controls, M = .068, SD = 1.06; 
t(355) = 1.95, p = .052, d = .21. At the same time, negative 
controls reported greater prejudice (M = .378, SD = 1.08) than 
no-video controls, t(359) = 2.75, p = .006, d = .29, Collective 
Blame Hypocrisy, t(354) = 4.87, p < .001, d = .52, and all 
other conditions (ts > 2.6, ps < .008).
The main effect of dehumanization was driven primarily 
by the negative control: Those in the negative control dehu-
manized Muslims more (M = 15.48, SD = 27.12), compared 
with the no-video controls, M = 8.56, SD = 25.18; t(357) = 
2.51, p = .013, d = .27, and compared with those in the 
Collective Blame Hypocrisy condition, M = 5.90, SD = 
21.96; t(351) = 3.64, p < .001, d = .39. Dehumanization 
reported by those in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy condi-
tion was lower than no-video controls, but not significantly 
so, t(354) = 1.06, p = .289.
We conceptualized collective blame as a belief that 
could shape anti-Muslim policy support and behavior both 
directly and also indirectly by increasing negative attitudes 
and beliefs about Muslims (i.e., prejudice, dehumaniza-
tion). In particular, to the extent that individuals collec-
tively blame all Muslims for mass violence committed by a 
few, people could come to feel more dislike toward Muslims 
and see the group in more dehumanized terms (e.g., as 
“savages”). Given that prejudice and dehumanization are 
both known to (independently) predict hostile outcomes 
(e.g., Kteily et al., 2015), any effect of collective blame on 
these constructs could have downstream consequences on 
their anti-Muslim policy support. Focusing on the effects of 
the most effective video (i.e., Collective Blame Hypocrisy—
Video 1), we used sequential mediation models (PROCESS, 
Hayes, 2012; Model 6) for each outcome measure to test 
the effect of condition (collective blame hypocrisy vs. con-
trol) on anti-Muslim policies, with collective blame as a 
first mediator and prejudice or dehumanization as subse-
quent mediators (to isolate their unique effects, we con-
trolled for dehumanization when examining prejudice and 
vice versa). Specifically, we examined the indirect effects 
of the intervention on the outcome measures via collective 
blame. These included the indirect effect of the intervention 
from collective blame directly to the outcome measures 
(i.e., independent of prejudice and dehumanization), as 
well as the sequential indirect effects from the intervention 
to the outcomes through collective blame and then each of 
prejudice and dehumanization.
We found that collective blame (CB) directly mediated the 
effect of condition on both distal outcome measures (condition 
 CB  anti-Muslim policies and punitive counterterrorism). 
There were also significant indirect effects from condition to 
the outcome measures via collective blame’s link to prejudice 
(condition  CB  prejudice  anti-Muslim policies and 
behavior). Notably, the indirect effect of condition on out-
comes through prejudice alone (condition  prejudice  
anti-Muslim policies) was not significant. The indirect effect 
from condition to the outcomes via collective blame’s link to 
dehumanization (condition  CB  dehumanization  anti-
Muslim policies) was not significant, nor was the indirect 
effect of condition on outcomes through dehumanization 
alone (condition  dehumanization  anti-Muslim policies). 
See Figures S2 and Table S2.3
Forecasting Tournament. To test the potential discrepancy 
between lay perceptions of our interventions’ effectiveness 
and their actual effectiveness, we assigned a separate group 
of Americans (N = 938) to view a video and predict its effect 
on collective blame (see Supplemental Study 1).
In this forecasting tournament, participants reported their 
predictions about how the video they were randomly assigned 
to watch would affect Americans’ collective blame of 
Muslims relative to control levels of collective blame:
When asked how responsible they think Muslims in general are 
for the Paris attacks in 2015, American mTurkers report an 
average response of 30 on a 100-point scale, where 0 = not at all 
responsible and 100 = completely responsible. After watching 
this video, how much do you think American mTurkers will 
hold Muslims responsible for the Paris attacks?
Participants were then provided a slider anchored at 0 (not at 
all responsible) and 100 (completely responsible), with the 
slider starting point set at 30 on the scale (i.e., the mean 
response for control participants in the interventions 
tournament).
Interestingly, the actual effect of the collective blame 
hypocrisy video on collective blame was significantly greater 
than the effect predicted by forecasters, t(272) = 2.44, p = 
.015, d = .30. See Supplementary Study 1 for details and 
Figure S3 and Table S3 for a summary of results.
Discussion
Overall, the intervention tournament revealed a strategy 
(Collective Blame Hypocrisy) that significantly reduced col-
lective blame and marginally reduced prejudice. Although 
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this intervention did not have direct effects on anti-Muslim 
policies (i.e., distal outcome measures), we did find evidence 
of significant indirect effects of the intervention on outcomes 
via its reduction of collective blame.
Two other approaches resulted in marginally significant 
reductions in collective blame: An interview with a Muslim 
woman who was friendly, intellectual, and assertive (i.e., 
counterstereotypical), and who presented evidence from Pew 
surveys challenging negative meta-perceptions among 
Americans with respect to Muslims (Video 6—“Challenge 
Meta-Perceptions”). This is consistent with previous 
research, which demonstrated a reduction in anti-Muslim 
attitudes among participants who were provided with a pur-
portedly real newspaper article that included information 
from these same surveys suggesting that Muslims saw 
Americans in a humanizing light (Kteily et al., 2016). A sec-
ond intervention that resulted in marginally lower collective 
blame was a video that presented two examples of White 
Americans engaging in prosocial gestures toward Muslims 
(Video 7—“Normative Prosocial”). These effects are consis-
tent with research on the impact of social norms on prejudice 
(e.g., Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). Although we 
decided to continue here by focusing on the Collective Blame 
Hypocrisy intervention because it had the numerically larg-
est effects, future research could explore the potential for 
normative intergroup interventions to shift intergroup atti-
tudes and behavior.
It is also noteworthy that the remaining five interventions 
failed to significantly reduce collective blame (or other anti-
Muslim sentiments). That said, because we “crowdsourced” 
the videos, rather than developing them ourselves to test spe-
cific theories, they often contained multiple potential psy-
chological elements. These elements were also packaged in 
ways that could have enhanced or detracted from their effi-
cacy. These results should therefore not be used as evidence 
against specific psychological theories. Instead, taking a 
rule-in (vs. rule-out) approach, we zoomed in on the 
Collective Blame Hypocrisy video, which, among other 
things, highlighted individuals’ hypocrisy in collectively 
blaming some groups but not others for the actions of a few. 
We focused on replicating the effects of this video (Study 2b) 
and then verifying our theoretical supposition that highlight-
ing hypocrisy was central to its effects (Studies 3a and 3b).
Study 2b
Study 2a established that revealing the hypocrisy of collec-
tively blaming Muslims but not White people/Christians for 
individual acts of violence significantly decreased collective 
blame of Muslims and marginally reduced prejudice; it also 
revealed that a video framing Muslims as collectively 
responsible for violence (i.e., Negative control—“Muslims 
Responsible”) increased collective blame, prejudice, and 
dehumanization. However, the number of conditions (and 
thus comparisons) increases the probability that our results 
reflected a false positive. In Study 2b, we therefore sought to 
replicate the results of Study 2a, focusing on the critical con-
ditions: Video 1—Collective Blame Hypocrisy, Negative 
Control—Muslims Responsible, and no-video control.
Participants. To obtain similar sample sizes for each of the 
three conditions as were obtained in Study 2a, we recruited 
600 participants on Mechanical Turk. Three people did not 
finish the survey, and 15 people failed the check question, 
leaving 582 participants (329 female, M
age
 = 34.69, SD = 
11.70). The final sample was 52.9% Christian, 1.9% Jewish, 
1.9% Buddhist, 0.2% Hindu, 37.1% atheist/agnostic, and 
6.0% “Other.” Ethnically, the sample was 77.3% White, 
5.2% Asian, 6.4% Hispanic, 7.7% Black, 0.7% Native 
American, 0.2% Arab, 1.9% biracial, and 0.7% “Other.”
Procedures and Stimuli. The procedure was identical to Study 
2a, except that participants were randomly assigned to one of 
only three conditions: Video 1—Collective Blame Hypoc-
risy, Negative Control—Muslims Responsible, or no-video 
control.
Collective blame was assessed as in Study 1.
Blatant Dehumanization was assessed with the multi-item 
trait measure from Study 1 (α = .95) and the single-item 
Ascent dehumanization measure from Study 2a. We com-
bined the measures to form a single scale by standardizing 
each and averaging them together (see, for example, Kteily 
& Bruneau, 2017).
Prejudice was assessed as in Studies 1 and 2a, by averag-
ing the z scored feeling thermometer and Islamoprejudice (α 
= .88) ratings, r = .66, p < .001, as was Anti-Muslim Policy 
Support (α = .91).4
Results
For descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations for 
the control condition, see Table S4. Mean results for each 
condition, ANOVAs, and t tests are presented in Table 4.
As predicted, a univariate ANOVA performed on collective 
blame revealed a main effect of condition, F(2, 578) = 19.0, p < 
.001, η2 = .062. Follow-up independent-samples t tests repli-
cated the results of Study 2a: Collective blame was approxi-
mately 10 points higher for those in the Muslims Responsible 
condition (M = 40.50, SD = 34.90) versus no-video controls, M 
= 29.89, SD = 33.03; t(390) = 3.09, p = .002, d = .31, and 
approximately 10 points lower for those in the Collective Blame 
Hypocrisy condition (M = 20.47, SD = 26.57) versus no-video 
controls, t(386) = 3.09, p = .002, d = .31; Table 4, Figure S4.
Demonstrating a similar pattern as Study 2a, but with 
stronger effects, ANOVAs for anti-Muslim attitudes and 
beliefs (prejudice, blatant dehumanization) were also sig-
nificant (Fs > 9.9, ps < .001, η2 > .030). Follow-up planned 
t tests showed that dehumanization was significantly higher 
for those in the Muslims Responsible condition (M = .24, 
SD = 1.02) than the no-video controls, M = –.030, 
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SD = 1.01; t(390) = 2.59, p = .010, d = .26; dehumanization 
was marginally lower for those in the Collective Blame 
Hypocrisy condition (M = –.21, SD = 0.92) than the no-
video controls, t(387) = 1.84, p = .067. Results for preju-
dice were very similar: Prejudice among those in the 
Muslims Responsible condition (M = .24, SD = 1.03) was 
significantly greater than for those in the no-video controls, 
M = .00, SD = 1.00; t(390) = 2.36, p = .019, d = .24, and 
prejudice was significantly lower for those in the Collective 
Blame Hypocrisy condition (M = –.24, SD = 0.90) than for 
no-video controls, t(387) = 2.50, p = .013, d = .26.
There was also a main effect of condition for the outcome 
measure, anti-Muslim policy support, F(2, 579) = 3.59, p = .028, 
η2 = .012, driven by a significant difference between the Muslims 
Responsible video and the Collective Blame Hypocrisy video, 
t(381) = 2.64, p = .009, d = .27. The difference between each 
video and the no-video control condition did not reach signifi-
cance (ts < 1.6, ps > .10). See Table 4 for a summary of results.
As with Study 2a, we tested the indirect effects of the inter-
vention (Collective Blame Hypocrisy video vs. no-video con-
trol) on anti-Muslim policy support. Consistent with Study 2a, 
there was a significant indirect effect from the condition to anti-
Muslim policies via collective blame (condition  CB  anti-
Muslim policies). Beyond the role collective blame played 
independent of prejudice and dehumanization, we also 
observed a significant sequential indirect effect from the inter-
vention condition on anti-Muslim policies through collective 
blame’s relationship with prejudice (condition  CB  preju-
dice  anti-Muslim policies) and (unlike Study 2a) dehuman-
ization (condition  CB  dehumanization  anti-Muslim 
policies). Also consistent with Study 2a, once the indirect 
effects via collective blame were taken into account, there were 
no significant indirect effects of condition on outcomes through 
prejudice or dehumanization (i.e., condition  prejudice/dehu-
manization  anti-Muslim policy support; all indirect effects 
included 0 in the 95% confidence intervals). See Figure S5 and 
Table S5. Study 2b therefore replicated the main results from 
Study 2a.5
Study 3a
Studies 2a and 2b provided evidence that a 2-min video 
interview with a Muslim American woman was sufficient to 
change how much people collectively blamed Muslims in 
general for individual acts of violence. A portion of the 
interview included a comment by the Muslim American 
guest that many people blame all Muslims for actions com-
mitted by individual Muslims, but do not blame all Christians 
for the actions of Christian extremist groups (i.e., the 
“Westboro Baptist Church” and the Ku Klux Klan [KKK], 
which are characterized as Hate Groups by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center; “Extremist Files: Westboro Baptist 
Church,” 2016). We hypothesized that this video effectively 
reduced collective blame because it helped to reveal to 
viewers the (potentially unconscious) hypocrisy of holding 
some groups (i.e., Muslims) more responsible for the actions 
of individual group members than other groups (i.e., White 
Americans, Christians). As holding inconsistent views is 
generally aversive (Festinger, 1962), we reasoned that the 
specter of hypocrisy was enough to cause people to reduce 
their attributions of collective blame so that they could 
avoid the inconsistency. However, video stimuli are inher-
ently complex, and it is possible that other aspects of the 
video were in fact responsible for the observed effects. If 
revealing the hypocritical nature of collective blame was in 
fact driving our effects as we assumed, then revealing it in 
Table 4. Study 2b Results: Means for All Measures Across Conditions, Omnibus ANOVAs, and Independent t Tests Across Conditions.
Condition
Collective 
blame
Blatant 
dehumanization Prejudice
Anti-Muslim 
policies
Scale 0-100 z score z score 1-7
Means (SD) Muslims responsible
(N = 193)
40.50
(34.90)
.237
(1.02)
.241
(1.03)
3.26
(1.85)
No-video controls
(N = 199)
29.89
(33.03)
−.030
(1.01)
.00
(1.00)
3.05
(1.71)
Collective blame hypocrisy
(N = 190)
20.47
(26.57)
−.210
(0.92)
−.244
(0.90)
2.78
(1.67)
 ANOVA
F(2, 578)
19.0***
η2 = .062
9.97***
η2 = .033
11.67***
η2 = .039
3.59*
η2 = .012
Independent t tests: t 
value (Cohen’s d)
Control vs. hypocrisy
t(387)
3.09***
(d = .31)
1.84†
(d = .19)
2.50*
(d = .26)
1.57
Muslims resp vs. control
t(390)
3.09***
(d = .31)
2.59*
(d = .26)
2.36*
(d = .24)
1.16
Muslims resp vs. hypocrisy
t(381)
6.30***
(d = .65)
4.50***
(d = .46)
4.89***
(d = .50)
2.64***
(d = .27)
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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other ways (i.e., beyond the specific video used in Studies 
2a and 2b) should yield similar effects.
In Study 3a, we therefore sought to specifically test the 
effects of revealing the intergroup bias in collective blame 
using a different and more controlled method. Rather than 
exposing participants to the hypocrisy of collective blame 
through a didactic argument, we illuminated the hypocrisy to 
participants through a targeted interactive activity that 
employed a Socratic approach. In the activity, participants 
first reported how much they blamed themselves and White 
Americans for acts of mass violence committed by highly 
self-identified White men. Next, using the same slider scale, 
participants reported how much they blamed individual 
Muslims for a terror attack. Finally, they reported how much 
they blamed Muslims in general for an act of mass violence 
committed by Muslims (i.e., collective blame). We reasoned 
that people would be very unlikely to blame themselves or 
White Americans for acts of mass violence by ingroup mem-
bers, and that they would subsequently hold Muslims mini-
mally responsible for acts of terrorism to avoid cognitive 
dissonance. In line with the results from Studies 2a and 2b, 
we further predicted that the hypothesized reductions in col-
lective blame would mediate reductions in anti-Muslim pol-
icy support and anti-Muslim behavior, both directly and by 
reducing anti-Muslim attitudes and beliefs (i.e., prejudice 
and dehumanization).
Method
Participants and design. We recruited 605 participants from 
Mechanical Turk for a five-condition study. Sample sizes 
were slightly smaller than obtained in Studies 2a and 2b, but 
still large enough to provide 80% power to detect a small to 
medium effect size (d = .35). Twelve people failed the atten-
tion check question, leaving 593 participants (314 female, 
M
age
 = 35.56, SD = 11.78). The final sample was 79.6% 
White, 5.7% Asian, 4.6% Hispanic, 7.4% Black, 1.0% Native 
American, 0.5% Middle Eastern, 1.0% biracial, and 0.2% 
“Other.” Due to a coding error, religious affiliation was not 
collected.
Participants were randomly placed into one of five condi-
tions: A Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity, a no-activity 
control condition, or one of three alternative activities 
(described below) that were inspired by psychological theory 
and represented in arguments that were widely circulated 
through social media (in an attempt to reduce anti-Muslim 
sentiments) in the wake of terror attacks by Muslim 
extremists.
Procedure and stimuli. The Collective Blame Hypocrisy activ-
ity was composed of two parts. First, participants reported 
how responsible they held White Americans and themselves 
for three different individual acts of violence committed by 
White people: Dylann Roof (who killed nine Black parishio-
ners at a church in 2015), Anders Breivik (who killed 77 
Norwegians, mostly children, in 2011), and Wage Page (who 
killed six Sikhs at a temple, believing they were Muslims, in 
2012). To foreshadow a comparison with violence commit-
ted by “Muslim extremists,” we noted that each perpetrator 
was motivated by his White identity. For example, “On June 
17, 2015, Dylann Roof entered the Emanuel African Meth-
odist Episcopal Church, and during a prayer service killed 
nine African American parishioners. Roof cited his White 
identity as a motivation for the attacks.” Participants then 
responded to the following: “How responsible do you think 
you are for the acts of Dylann Roof?” and “How responsible 
do you think White Americans are for the acts of Dylann 
Roof?” Responses to each question were made using 
unmarked sliders anchored at 0 (not at all responsible) and 
100 (completely responsible). We then asked how responsi-
ble participants felt White Americans were for hate crimes 
by White supremacists in the United States, and White 
supremacists in Europe. We predicted that participants would 
attribute very little responsibility to themselves and White 
Americans for the specific actions of mass violence, and for 
hate crimes committed by White supremacist groups.
Next, we asked participants to report, using the same 
scales, how responsible they felt individual Muslims were 
for an act of violence committed by Muslim extremists (e.g., 
“Ahmad works as a bank teller in Jordan. How responsible 
do you think Ahmad is for the Brussels Airport attacks?”). 
Finally, we asked how responsible they thought Muslims 
were, in general, for the Paris terror attacks. Overall, we 
hypothesized that reporting low levels of collective blame 
for oneself and White Americans would precipitate lower 
levels of collective blame of Muslims, in general, for terror 
attacks, which would have downstream effects on anti-Mus-
lim attitudes and policy support.
Similar to Study 2a, we examined the impact of the 
Hypocrisy activity relative to other popular approaches that 
mapped broadly onto psychological theories suggesting their 
plausibility in reducing collective blame. The first (“Ingroup 
Guilt”) exposed participants to historical opinion polling 
prior to and during World War II showing that Americans 
were opposed to accepting Jewish refugees. We hypothe-
sized that this could elicit collective ingroup guilt for 
American rejection of Jews during the Holocaust—a moral 
emotion that has been shown to facilitate support for repara-
tions (Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008; 
Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011; 
Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004). We reasoned that 
individuals who were exposed to this information might 
soften their attitudes toward Muslims and Muslim refugees 
to assuage their guilt. This strategy was used widely in social 
media to evoke sympathy for Muslim refugees, and was 
reported on by major news outlets (e.g., The Washington 
Post; Tharoor, 2015). A second version of the intervention 
additionally presented photos directly drawing the link 
between interned Jewish children and interned Muslim refu-
gee children, and provided a statement by the Holocaust 
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Memorial admonishing governments for their refusal to 
accept Muslim refugees. Because this version had an addi-
tional component that, at least in theory, strengthened the 
basis for feeling guilt, we labeled this intervention “Ingroup 
Guilt+.” Although we thought it plausible that these two 
interventions (Ingroup Guilt and Ingroup Guilt+) could also 
reduce collective blame of Muslims, we thought it most 
likely that this intervention would change policy support and 
behaviors toward Muslims via reducing prejudice.
The final intervention was designed to challenge stereo-
types about Muslim aggression by highlighting participants’ 
incorrect assumptions. As with the stereotype reduction vid-
eos, we predicted that challenging the stereotype of Muslims 
as violent may reduce the tendency to blame all Muslims for 
the violent actions of individual group members. In the activ-
ity (“Counterstereotyping”), participants were first asked to 
guess statistics related to aggression by Muslims and refu-
gees (e.g., the percent of European terror attacks in the past 
10 years that had been perpetrated by Muslims). After guess-
ing, participants were shown the true answer, which was con-
sistently less in line with prevailing stereotypes than their 
estimates. Specifically, the mean estimate for the percent of 
European terror attacks committed by Muslims over a 5-year 
period was 38.75% (SD = 31.92), and the correct response, 
subsequently revealed, is less than 2% (more than 97% of the 
sample overestimated the statistic). Similarly, of the 190,000 
murders committed in the United Sates since 9/11, partici-
pants guessed that on average 5,042 (SD = 18,742) were 
committed by Muslim extremists, whereas the correct answer 
is 37 (more than 65% of participants overestimated); and of 
the 194,000 refugees granted shelter in the United States 
since 9/11, participants guessed on average that 899 (SD = 
5,580) had committed murder, whereas the correct answer is 
0 (more than 70% of participants overestimated).6 As part of 
collectively blaming Muslims for violence likely involves 
the stereotype that Muslims as a group are violent, we pre-
dicted that challenging this perception could potentially 
reduce collective blame and anti-Muslim sentiments.
After completing one of the activities (or no activity in the 
control condition), participants completed a survey that 
included the key measure of collective blame, as well as bla-
tant dehumanization, prejudice, and two downstream out-
come measures: support for anti-Muslim policies and signing 
anti-Muslim petitions.
Collective Blame was assessed as in Studies 1 and 2b (i.e., 
toward the Paris terror attacks).
Dehumanization was assessed as in Study 2b, by stan-
dardizing and then combining the trait measure (α = .91) and 
the Ascent dehumanization measure (r = .55, p < .001).
Prejudice was assessed with feeling thermometers, and 
expressed as the difference between warmth toward 
Americans versus Muslims.
Anti-Muslim Policy Support (α = .94) was assessed as in 
Studies 1, 2a, and 2b; Signing Anti-Muslim Petitions (α = 
.87) was assessed as in Study 1.7
Results
For descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations for 
the control condition, see Table S6. Mean results for each 
condition, ANOVAs, and t tests are presented in Table 5. 
None of the measures differed across the Ingroup Guilt ver-
sus Ingroup Guilt+ interventions (ts < 1.3, ps > .20), so 
results were collapsed across the two.
First, we assessed levels of blame attributed to oneself, 
White Americans, and individual Muslims for those who 
engaged in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity. We 
found that self-blame for the three specific events was near 
floor on the 100-point scale (M = 9.73, SD = 19.46). 
Collective blame was similarly low for White Americans 
across the three events (M = 9.73, SD = 18.64), for White 
supremacists in the United States (M = 12.40, SD = 24.88) 
and White supremacists in Europe (M = 9.59, SD = 19.86). 
After assessing blame for themselves and White people, 
Americans attributed very little blame to individual Muslims 
(M = 8.65, SD = 22.28).
Next, we turned to the primary measure of interest: col-
lective blame of Muslims. Overall, there was a main effect of 
condition, F(4, 582) = 5.37, p < .001, η2 = .036, and planned 
t tests revealed the predicted outcome: For participants who 
participated in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity, col-
lective blame of Muslims (M = 17.78, SD = 29.07) was half 
what it was for controls, M = 35.46, SD = 37.59; t(302) = 
4.12, p < .001, d = .47. Collective blame was also signifi-
cantly lower for those who engaged in the Collective Blame 
Hypocrisy activity than for those who took part in each of the 
other activities (Ms = 35.01-36.93; ts > 3.7, ps < .001; see 
Figure S6). There were also main effects for blatant dehu-
manization, anti-Muslim refugee policy support, and anti-
Muslim petition signing (see Table 5) that was driven by the 
Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity: Compared with the 
control condition, those who completed the Collective Blame 
Hypocrisy activity reported less blatant dehumanization, 
t(303) = 2.38, p = .016, d = .27, showed less anti-Muslim 
refugee policy support, t(303) = 2.04, p = .042, d = .23, and 
were less likely to sign anti-Muslim petitions, t(303) = 2.24, 
p = .026, d = .26. Only prejudice was not significantly differ-
ent for those in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy condition 
versus no-activity controls, t(303) = 1.6, p = .11.
Aside from Hypocrisy, none of the other activities were 
significantly different from the control condition for any of 
the measures (ts < 1.6, ps > .10). See Table 5 for full results 
across all conditions.
As with Studies 2a and 2b, we tested the sequential indirect 
effect of the intervention (Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity) 
versus no-activity control on outcomes, with collective blame as 
a first mediator and dehumanization or prejudice (controlling for 
the other) as a second mediator. Consistent with Studies 2a and 
2b, there were significant indirect effects of condition on the out-
come measures via collective blame (condition  CB  anti-
Muslim policies; condition  CB  anti-Muslim behavior). 
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Also consistent with Studies 2a and 2b, there were significant 
sequential indirect effects from the condition to each of 
the outcomes via collective blame’s link to prejudice (condi-
tion  CB  prejudice  anti-Muslim policies; condition   
CB  prejudice  anti-Muslim behavior) and dehumanization 
(condition  CB dehumanization  anti-Muslim policies; 
condition  CB  dehumanization  anti-Muslim behavior). 
Again consistent with Studies 2a and 2b, all the indirect effects 
were mediated through collective blame: The indirect effects 
of condition on outcomes through prejudice or dehumaniza-
tion controlling for collective blame (i.e., condition  preju-
dice/dehumanization  outcomes) were all nonsignificant (all 
95% confidential intervals [CIs] included 0). For results 
regarding anti-Muslim behavior, see Figure 1 and Table 6. For 
results regarding anti-Muslim policy support, see Figure S7 
and Table S7.
Discussion
In sum, we followed up on the successful video intervention 
from Studies 2a and 2b by targeting the specific mechanism 
that we posited had been crucial to the video’s success (i.e., 
revealing hypocrisy in collective blame). In the interactive 
activity, participants were required to first reflect on their own 
(and White people’s) lack of collective responsibility for the 
actions of individual group members. Subsequently, they 
reported levels of collective blame of Muslims that were half 
those reported in the control condition, thus avoiding potential 
cognitive dissonance. Consistent with our theorizing about the 
causal impact of collective blame, those who completed the 
Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity reported lower levels of 
prejudice and dehumanization, and were less likely to endorse 
anti-Muslim policies, and sign anti-Muslim petitions, relative 
to no-activity controls. All changes in outcomes were medi-
ated by the activity’s effect on collective blame.
Study 3b
As with the video interventions tournament, we conducted a 
follow-up study to replicate the effects from the activities 
tournament. In Study 3b, we also examined a variant of the 
Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity (“Hypocrisy+”). This 
activity was identical to the Collective Blame Hypocrisy 
activity, with one exception: After completing the activity, 
participants in this condition were asked to report on (a) a 
time when they thought they were responsible for the nega-
tive actions of an ingroup member, (b) a time when they 
thought an outgroup member was responsible for the actions 
of another outgroup member, and, finally, (c) whether they 
found it easier to generate an example in which others (vs. 
they themselves) were responsible for their group member’s 
actions. We hypothesized that the additional reflection about 
internal biases induced by completing these questions could 
potentially accentuate the effects of the activity.
Table 5. Study 3a Results: Means for All Measures Across Conditions, Omnibus ANOVAs, and Independent t tests Across Conditions.
Condition
Collective 
blame
Blatant 
dehumanization Prejudice
Support anti-
Muslim policies
Sign anti-Muslim 
petitions
Scale 0-100 z score –100-+100 1-7 –1-+1
M (SD) No-activity controls
(N = 206)
35.45
(37.59)
0.117
(.928)
30.74
(36.39)
3.87
(1.80)
−0.062
(.441)
Hypocrisy Activity
(N = 99)
17.78
(29.07)
−0.148
(.875)
23.42
(39.10)
3.43
(1.68)
−0.184
(.458)
Ingroup guilt
(N = 190)
35.29
(35.59)
−0.023
(.830)
27.34
(36.54)
3.78
(1.74)
−0.070
(.477)
Counterstereotype
(N = 98)
37.40
(36.23)
−0.052
(.785)
24.13
(35.16)
3.57
(1.62)
−0.080
(.470)
 ANOVA
F(4, 582)
5.37***
η2 = .036
1.82 0.931 1.41 1.73
Independent t tests: t 
value (Cohen’s d)
Hypocrisy vs. control
t(303)
4.12***
(d = .47)
2.38*
(d = .27)
1.60 2.04*
(d = .23)
2.24*
(d = .26)
Hypocrisy vs. guilt
t(287)
4.21***
(d = .50)
1.19 0.84 1.65 1.94†
(d = .23)
Hypocrisy vs. counterstereo
t(195)
4.18***
(d = .60)
0.81 0.13 .59 1.57
Guilt vs. control
t(394)
0.04 1.58 0.93 .50 0.19
Challenge vs. control
t(302)
0.42 1.56 1.50 1.41 0.33
Note. Counterstereo = Counterstereotype intervention.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Method
Participants and design. Consistent with the previous studies, 
we recruited 200 participants per each of three conditions. Of 
the 600 people recruited, 15 failed an embedded check ques-
tion, leaving 585 participants (346 female, M
age
 = 34.54, 
SD = 11.50). The final sample was 48.4% Christian, 2.2% 
Jewish, 1.7% Buddhist, 0.3% Hindu, 40.5% atheist/agnostic, 
and 6.8% “Other.” Ethnically, the sample was 77.3% White, 
5.1% Asian, 5.6% Hispanic, 6.2% Black, 0.9% Native Ameri-
can, 0.5% Middle Eastern, 4.1% biracial, and 0.3% “Other.”
Procedure and stimuli. The Collective Blame Hypocrisy activ-
ity was identical to the activity in Study 3a, with the follow-
ing exception: Instead of asking how responsible White 
Americans were for the actions of American and European 
White extremists, we asked how responsible participants 
thought mainstream Christians were for the actions of the 
KKK.
Collective Blame was measured as in Study 2b (collective 
blame of Muslims for the Brussels Airport attacks), Blatant 
Dehumanization was measured with the trait measure of 
dehumanization used in Studies 1, 2b, and 3a, and 
Islamoprejudice was measured as in Studies 1, 2a, and 2b.8
Results
For descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations, see 
Table S8. Mean results for each condition, ANOVAs, and t 
tests are presented in Table 7.
Among those who engaged in the Hypocrisy activities, 
self-blame was near floor on the 100-point scale (M = 4.74, 
SD = 18.03), and collective blame of White Americans and 
Christians was similarly very low (Whites: M = 9.78, SD = 
17.84; Christians: M = 11.38, SD = 20.86). After assessing 
blame for themselves, White people and Christians, 
Figure 1. Model testing the effect of condition (Control vs. Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity) on anti-Muslim behavior (signing anti-
Muslim petitions) through collective blame and either dehumanization or prejudice (while controlling for the other) for Study 3a.
Note. Unstandardized coefficients displayed.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 6. Study 3a.
Effects Anti-Muslim petitions
Cond  CB  outcome –.042 [–.079, –.017]
Cond  Dehum  outcome −.002 [–.020, .013]
Cond  Prejudice  outcome .005 [–.019, .033]
Cond  CB  Dehum  outcome –.020 [–.043, –.004]
Cond  CB  Prejudice  outcome –.029 [–.053, –.013]
Total indirect (CB + Dehum) –.064 [–.109, –.026]
Total indirect (CB + Prejudice) –.065 [–.119, –.018]
Total direct −.035 [–.130, .061]
Total effect (CB + Dehum) −.081 [–.178, .016]
Total effect (CB + Prejudice) −.065 [–.164, .033]
Note. Unstandardized indirect, direct, and total effects of condition 
(Cond) on behavior (signing anti-Muslim petitions) through sequential 
mediators: Mediator 1 = collective blame (CB) and Mediator 2 = 
dehumanization (Dehum; controlling for prejudice) or prejudice 
(controlling for dehumanization). Results reported as point estimate with 
95% confidence interval in brackets. Results in bold are significant: 95% CI 
does not include 0. CI = confidential interval.
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Americans attributed very little blame to individual Muslims 
(M = 2.65, SD = 10.53).
For the key collective blame measure, we found the pre-
dicted main effect of condition, F(2, 580) = 54.38, p < .001, 
η2 = .16, and planned t tests confirmed that collective blame 
of Muslims among those in the control condition (M = 
34.10, SD = 34.52) was significantly greater than for those 
who engaged either in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy 
activity, M = 11.70, SD = 22.77; t(390) = 7.61, p < .001, d = 
.78, or the Collective Blame Hypocrisy+ activity, M = 9.29, 
SD = 16.92; t(382) = 8.93, p < .001, d = .97; see Table 7 and 
Figure S8.
Although we hypothesized that the Collective Blame 
Hypocrisy+ intervention might be significantly stronger than 
the Hypocrisy intervention, the two conditions did not differ 
from each other on any of the measures (ts < 1.2, ps > .23). 
As collective blame of Muslims among those in the Hypocrisy 
activity were just as low as collective blame of Christians 
and Whites (and lower than observed in Study 3a), it is pos-
sible that the lack of difference between Collective Blame 
Hypocrisy activities was due to a floor effect (i.e., the inter-
group bias in collective blame was eliminated).
Also consistent with Study 3a, blatant dehumanization of 
Muslims was significantly lower for those in the Collective 
Blame Hypocrisy conditions (M = 3.23, SD = 1.29) versus con-
trols, M = 3.55, SD = 1.40; t(583) = 2.74, p = .006, d = .23, and 
those who engaged in a Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity 
also expressed significantly less prejudice (M = 32.94, SD = 
24.45) than controls, M = 38.40, SD = 27.12; t(583) = 2.45, p = 
.015, d = .20. See Table 7 and Figure S8. Anti-Muslim policy 
attitudes and behavior were not assessed in Study 3b.
Therefore, as with Study 3a, collective blame (and dehu-
manization) of Muslims was significantly reduced among 
participants who engaged in one of two variants of the 
Hypocrisy activity versus no-activity controls.
Meta-Analysis
Finally, to compare results across the Hypocrisy video 
and Hypocrisy activities, we combined the results from the 
Hypocrisy video and controls (Studies 2a and 2b) and the 
Hypocrisy activities and controls (Studies 3a and 3b), and 
performed a 2 modality (video, activity) × 2 condition (inter-
vention, control) ANOVA with collective blame as the out-
come. We found that there was a strong main effect of 
condition, F(1, 1659) = 114.89, p < .001, η2 = .065, illustrat-
ing that the hypocrisy approach reliably reduces collective 
Table 7. Study 3b Results: Means for All Measures Across Conditions, Omnibus ANOVAs, and Independent t Tests Across Conditions.
Condition Collective blame Blatant dehumanization Prejudice
Scale 0-100 1-7 0-100
Means (SD) No-activity controls
(N = 193)
34.10
(34.52)
3.55
(1.40)
38.40
(27.12)
Hypocrisy activity
(N = 199)
11.70
(22.77)
3.27
(1.37)
33.73
(24.48)
Hypocrisy + Activity
(N = 193)
9.29
(16.92)
3.20
(1.21)
32.13
(24.46)
 ANOVA
F(2, 582)
54.38***
η2 = .158
3.88*
η2 = .013
3.19*
η2 = .011
Independent t tests: t 
value (Cohen’s d)
Control vs. hypocrisy
t(390)
7.61***
(d = .78)
2.04*
(d = .20)
1.79†
(d = .18)
Control vs. hypocrisy+
t(581)
8.93***
(d = .97)
2.67**
(d = .27)
2.39*
(d = .24)
Control vs. hypocrisy (combined)
t(581)
10.39***
(d = .86)
2.74**
(d = .23)
2.45*
(d = .20)
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Figure 2. Results of meta-analysis across all participants who 
were in either the hypocrisy intervention or control condition for 
Studies 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b.
Note. Error bars represent ± standard error of the mean. Differences 
between all groups p < .001. Reported are Cohen’s d effect sizes.
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blame. We also found a significant Modality × Condition 
interaction, F(1, 1659) = 19.12, p < .001, η2 = .011, such that 
collective blame was reduced more by engaging in the 
Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity (M = 11.99, SD = 22.22) 
versus watching the Collective Blame Hypocrisy video (M = 
20.92, SD = 27.75). See Figure 2.
General Discussion
Intergroup violence is a major cause of death and suffering 
around the world. In 2014 alone, over 180,000 people died in 
violent conflicts, and an estimated 50 million were displaced 
(Armed Conflict Survey 2015, 2015). Understanding the psy-
chological processes that feed conflict, and how to short-cir-
cuit these processes, may be critical to reducing human 
suffering (see Kteily & Bruneau, 2017). Here, we examine one 
process particularly relevant to conflict escalation—collective 
blame—which can induce vicarious retribution against unin-
volved outgroup members following an act of violence (Lickel 
et al., 2006), and which we suggest can stimulate a conflict 
spiral in intergroup contexts. Our work advances previous 
research on the consequences of collective blame—which has 
been examined largely in organizational settings—by showing 
that collective blame of Muslims for terror attacks is associ-
ated with anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior.
Most importantly, we provide evidence that revealing the 
hypocrisy of collectively blaming Muslims for acts of terror-
ism, but not collectively blaming White people or Christians 
for individual acts of violence by members of those groups, 
reliably reduces collective blame of Muslims, and thereby 
decreases anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior associated 
with vicarious retribution. The results were robust whether 
the collective blame hypocrisy was revealed didactically in a 
brief video or when revealed through a Socratic activity. In 
both cases, the approaches highlighting hypocrisy in collec-
tive blame were numerically more effective than all other 
alternative videos and activities and significantly more effec-
tive than most. The effects of the intervention were also not 
obvious, as an independent sample of forecasters predicted 
that the Collective Blame Hypocrisy video used in Studies 2a 
and 2b would be completely ineffective—extending the lit-
erature on individuals’ poor forecasting of effective interven-
tions (Cialdini, 2003) by showing that this also applies to 
interventions aimed at reducing intergroup hostility.
Our findings contribute to a long tradition of research 
demonstrating that highlighting hypocrisy can drive behav-
ior change. The hypocrisy paradigm has been effective in 
several contexts, increasing condom use (Aronson et al., 
1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994), the 
recycling of household waste (Fried & Aronson, 1995), 
and respect of traffic laws (Fointiat, 2004). Our data extend 
this prior research, showing that similar results can also be 
obtained when it comes to reducing collective blame and 
improving intergroup attitudes and behaviors.
At the same time, the cognitive dissonance literature has 
also demonstrated that arguments highlighting hypocrisy and 
other threats to self-worth can sometimes backfire. For 
example, people have been shown to resolve the dissonance 
between their support for environmental policies and recall-
ing times when they wasted water in some cases by reducing 
water usage (Dickerson et al., 1992), but in others by dero-
gating the importance of water rationing policies (Liégeois, 
Yserbyt, & Corneille, 2005). If a hypocrisy intervention 
were to induce defensiveness—for example, by publicly 
shaming the participants—it seems likely that it could exac-
erbate, rather than ease, the desired attitude or behavior. 
Inductions of defensiveness may help to explain why some 
of the interventions from the current research failed to reduce 
collective blame or anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior, even 
though they might have led to cognitive dissonance by high-
lighting hypocrisy or revealing incorrect beliefs. For exam-
ple, Video 3 called out the hypocrisy of reporters viewing all 
Muslim countries as the same (and not doing this with 
Christian countries), and Video 8 implied hypocrisy by hav-
ing people respond to passages that were purportedly from 
the Quran, but were in fact revealed to be from the Bible. 
These approaches could not only invoke hypocrisy but also 
involve an element of public shaming or combativeness. It is 
possible that the combativeness reduces their efficacy.
By contrast, the didactic approach in the Collective Blame 
Hypocrisy video does not call out the hypocrisy of the inter-
viewer, but reveals it as a view held by unnamed others. The 
Socratic approach in the activity is even more gentle, allowing 
participants to proactively avoid reporting any hypocrisy 
themselves. It would be interesting to see if adjusting the other 
potentially threatening interventions could render them more 
successful. For example, the “Counter-Stereotype” activity 
intervention from Study 3a could allow participants to dis-
cover the statistics about refugee violence on their own, rather 
than correcting them after their erroneous predictions. Because 
these interventions were chosen from popular approaches, 
were not explicitly designed to test particular theories, and 
might have been effective had they been presented in different 
ways, we think it important to emphasize that the absence of 
effects here for some of the interventions should not be held as 
evidence against a psychological approach to which they were 
mapped (e.g., counterstereotyping).
Although the principal focus of this research was on inter-
ventions aimed at reducing collective blame and other anti-
Muslim sentiments, it is also worth highlighting the 
“effectiveness” of the negative control video at increasing col-
lective blame attributions (and anti-Muslim attitudes and pol-
icy support). From a theoretical perspective, the fact that this 
intervention increased downstream hostility via collective 
blame provides further confidence in our proposed model: Just 
as reducing collective blame can reduce dehumanization and 
prejudice with consequences for outcomes like support for 
anti-Muslim policies, increasing collective blame can do the 
446 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 44(3)
reverse. From a practical perspective, the fact that a brief video 
can dramatically and reliably increase anti-Muslim sentiments 
highlights concerns about the anti-Muslim rhetoric increas-
ingly prevalent on certain media platforms and frequently pro-
mulgated by the current U.S. president (Kteily & Bruneau, 
2017). At the very least, the effectiveness of the negative con-
trol at increasing anti-Muslim hostility suggests that a great 
need for countermessaging exists. Determining what types of 
messages (including collective blame hypocrisy and beyond) 
might protect against or mitigate the negative effects of a com-
pelling narrative that includes anti-Muslim speech represents 
an important avenue of future research.
Limitations and Future Directions
Despite the consistent and robust results from this research, 
it is important to note some limitations. First, it is important 
to acknowledge that the results were obtained exclusively 
from samples obtained through Mechanical Turk. Although 
mTurk samples are reliable and diverse (Buhrmester, Kwang, 
& Gosling, 2011), it is possible that other populations may 
respond differently. For example, very liberal samples (e.g., 
psychology undergraduates) may be near floor in collective 
blame to begin with, which would minimize or eliminate the 
efficacy of the intervention.
Second, still more work is required to better understand the 
psychological mechanisms behind the collective blame hypoc-
risy approach. Although the approach is similar to cognitive 
dissonance hypocrisy paradigms, there are some key differ-
ences that may reveal significant disparities between the effec-
tiveness of these approaches in the intergroup context. For 
example, the strength of cognitive dissonance hypocrisy para-
digms is enhanced when cognitive dissonance (and therefore 
internal discomfort) is maximized (Fried & Aronson, 1995). 
By contrast, the collective blame hypocrisy activity allows 
people to preemptively avoid cognitive dissonance. Allowing 
cognitive dissonance to establish itself first, for example, by 
having people declare their collective blame of Muslims 
before being exposed to an argument about hypocrisy in col-
lective blame, might reduce the efficacy of the intervention by 
making people feel defensive and/or “trapped.” These predic-
tions should be tested in future research.
Third, we demonstrate here effects immediately follow-
ing the interventions; future research should establish how 
long the effects of the intervention last.
Fourth, the results reported here refer to a single target 
group. Although collective blame of Muslims is an important 
phenomenon that could be driving some of the most pressing 
contemporary violence in the United States today (mass vio-
lence by Muslim extremists and anti-Muslim hate crimes, 
which are mutually reciprocal), it will be important in the 
future to extend these results to other groups. For example, it 
will be important to see if the degree to which marginalized 
groups like African Americans in the United States and the 
Roma in Europe are collectively blamed for violence and drug 
abuse/trafficking, and whether this perception can similarly be 
reduced through the collective blame hypocrisy approach.
Finally, it is worth acknowledging the variable strength of 
the evidence for the direct effects of the interventions on the 
outcome measures, and discussing the causal ordering 
implied by our model. The Collective Blame Hypocrisy 
video and interactive activity very consistently influenced 
levels of collective blame across all studies. The interven-
tions also reduced prejudice in Studies 2b and 3b (but mar-
ginally in Study 2a and not in Study 3a) and dehumanization 
in Studies 3a and 3b (but marginally in Study 2b and not in 
Study 2a). On the contrary, despite the significant indirect 
effects of the hypocrisy intervention on anti-Muslim policy 
support and anti-Muslim behavior via collective blame and 
prejudice/dehumanization in all studies, only the Socratic 
activity (and not the video) exerted direct effects on these 
outcomes. The fact that our manipulation of collective blame 
had stronger direct effects on prejudice and dehumanization 
than on anti-Muslim policies and behavior is consistent with 
our model of attitudes and beliefs about Muslims as more 
proximal than policy support and behavior. At the same time, 
although we provided causal evidence that manipulating 
hypocrisy produced downstream effects on prejudice, dehu-
manization, and policy attitudes and behavior via collective 
blame, we did not explicitly test the causal relationship 
between prejudice/dehumanization and the policy attitudes 
and behavior. That part of our model therefore remains more 
tentative, requiring confirmatory research.
Conclusion
In sum, we established causal relationships between revealing 
the hypocrisy of collectively blaming some groups more than 
others for the acts of individuals and reducing collective blame 
of Muslims for individual terror attacks. In turn, we found 
across all studies that changes in collective blame mediated 
the relationship between intervention exposure and down-
stream policy support and behaviors associated with vicarious 
retribution, both directly and through collective blame’s link 
to anti-Muslim prejudice and dehumanization. Taken together, 
our results highlight the importance of collective blame in 
intergroup conflict and show that making people aware of the 
hypocrisy inherent in blaming some groups more than others 
for the actions of individual outgroup members can mitigate 
collective blame and diminish downstream consequences 
associated with vicarious retribution.
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Notes
1. Due to the high number of experimental conditions, we did not 
correct for multiple comparisons in Study 2a (which would have 
resulted in a highly conservative threshold). Instead, we opted to 
confirm any significant results with a replication study (Study 2b).
2. Included in the survey for other purposes, but not analyzed here, 
were measures of socioeconomic status, social dominance ori-
entation (SDO), conservatism, media consumption, and support 
for 2016 American presidential candidates.
3. Examining the negative control versus controls yielded similar 
results, in the opposite direction.
4. Included in the survey for other purposes, but not analyzed fur-
ther here, were measures of socioeconomic status, educational 
attainment, media consumption, and support for 2016 American 
presidential candidates.
5. Examining the negative control versus controls yielded similar 
results, in the opposite direction.
6. All subsequent analyses for this condition are similar for those 
who overestimated Muslim violence on one or all items, and 
those who did not overestimate on any.
7. Included in the survey for exploratory purposes, but not analyzed 
further here, were measures of socioeconomic status, educational 
attainment, employment, political conservatism, SDO, right-
wing authoritarianism (RWA), and need for cognition (NFC).
8. Included in the survey for exploratory purposes, but not ana-
lyzed here, were measures of socioeconomic status, educational 
attainment, employment, conservatism, SDO, RWA, NFC, and 
support for 2016 American presidential candidates.
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